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(1766-1S24.)
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AINE DE BIRAN was

said by Cousin to have been the first
French metaphysicians since Malebranche. This is true,
especially, if we understand by a metaphysician, as they did in the
of

eighteenth century, a thinker

who

studies the origin of our knowl-

Yet this original and deep
Maine de
philosopher was but little known to his contemporaries.
Biran, though he wrote much, published but little during his lifetime, and what he gave to the world was not sufficient to make his
edge, and the genesis of our ideas.

It was Cousin, who, in 1834, and afterthought fully understood.
wards in 1841, edited part of the manuscripts left by Maine de
Since then other unpublished works have been edited,
Biran.
If we have not yet the whole of Maine de
chiefly by M. Naville.
Biran's writings, we possess enough to feel assured that no essential

part of his doctrine

now escapes

us.

Maine de Biran never taught.

Being

a

life-guardsman to

Louis the Sixteenth in 1789, and later sub-prefect, and councillor
of State, if he was also a philosopher it was in virtue of a strong
A sort of instinct irresistibly
natural aptitude and inclination.
impelled him to make a study of himself. His health being delicate,
he was watchful of the slightest changes in his physical condition
and in his consciousness due to surrounding circumstances, and
was consequently predisposed to introspection. "When one has
he writes, "or but a faint conscious sense of
more inclined to observe internal phenomena. This
He heard the
is why I became so early in life a psychologist."
springs of the machine creaking, and he felt his thought straining

little

vitality,"

vitality,

one

is

or slackening with them.

His taste

for

psychology

first

found food

in Condillac,

and then
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He became

acquainted with Cabanis, and was
and though later he thought that he had
advanced beyond his doctrine, he never completely rejected it. But
he also read the Genevese Charles Bonnet, and it was probably by
him that he was led to stud}' the philosophy of Leibnitz, and to
seek a psychological interpretation of it that would be in harmony
with his own tendencies.
It was at this time that he wrote his
Mcmoire sur V Habitude (1805), an original and thoughtful work,
which, under a form that suggests Condillac, already manifests
in the Ideologists.

afterwards his friend

;

Victor Cousin (1792-1867).

many

of his

own personal and independent

views.

In the next

period he reached the clearest expression of his thought and expounded what he looked upon as his most important theory, to
wit,

the theory of effort, or of the

first

fact

of

consciousness.

In this he was seconded by his friend Ampere, the celebrated
physicist,

He

whose philosophical work

is

inseparable from his own.

often enunciated his ideas at philosophical meetings held at his

house

in

Paris.

Royer-Collard was wont to be present, and also
the thought of

"young Professor Cousin," who comprehended
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when ill, and
Biran
inclined
Maine
de
anxious to find a "firm and steady prop,"
he had
philosophy;
and
kind
of
towards a mystical and religious
his
life.
end
of
yielded himself fully to it before the
Condillac's psychology had separated, so to speak, conscious
Convinced that "we never get out of ourness from organism.
selves," he thought himself thus justified in studying only what
reflection and analysis can reach and decompose within ourselves.
Now this is an abstraction which Maine de Biran constantly finds
to be contradicted by his personal experience. Our humor changes,
Maine de Biran marvellously

well.

In later years,

our self-confidence disappears or returns withis it not because a multitude of dim sensaout our knowing how
tions are produced within us, of which we are made aware only by

our attention

flags,

;

their effects?

Thus experimental psychology can

as yet describe

This science
only the smallest portion of the soul's phenomena.
begins with clear apperception, and with the distinction between
the "self" and

its

But how many things take place

modifications.

and after the first consciousness of the
which will never come within the range of our knowledge
These things Maine de Biran calls pure impressions, or simple

in the soul before, during,
self,

!

impressions; they constitute the "affective life."
Leibnitz's dim and insensible perceptions

to

;

They correspond
perhaps more

or,

"These impersonal sensations,
which I shall term pure affections, may be considered as the most
immediate results of functions that underlie a general organic life
.... a state previous even to the birth of a conscious and thinking subject." This was a fruitful thought, which experimental
psychology has turned to excellent account in our days. This
science admits as a principle, as Maine de Biran did, that "simple
exactly, to Cabanis's "sensibility."

impressions

may

constitute an absolute sort of existence, sui generis,

M.
apart from any distinct personality or consciousness of self.
Pierre Ganet, for instance, has returned to this hypothesis in order
to

explain

many

surprising

cases of hysterical

amnesia, of twofold personality,

anesthesia and

etc.

This part of ourselves which escapes our knowledge also
The affective life is independent of our will,

escapes our power.

though our* will depends upon it. It is a purely passive basis of
our complex being, from which the Ego can never be separated,
and which becomes tense or slack or altered without our being able
to interfere, at any rate directly; a sum of organic dispositions we
are the less able to modify since they are the very source of our
powers and volitions. They result from our temperament, and
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is but the physiognomy of temperament^a
which we are indebted to Bichat, the physioloand which Maine de Biran made his own by exploring it

what we

call

character

striking phrase, for
gist,

thoroughly.

At about the same epoch Schopenhauer in German}' was saysame thing; and though he was in nowise acquainted with
the works of Maine de Biran, there is in this more than a mere
Between Schopenhauer's psychology,' and
fortuitous coincidence.
that of Maine de Biran there lie hidden, under obvious differences,
deep analogies. If little attention has hitherto been paid in France
to this fact, it is because of a predisposition to see in Maine de
Biran one of the founders of contemporary spiritualism, and he
is therefore associated with Cousin rather than with Bichat or
ing the

—

Cabanis.

But this interpretation, while not false, is certainly incomplete,
and not in harmony with history. Maine de Biran owes nothing to
Cousin, and was, especially in his two earlier periods, imbued with
the doctrines of Bichat and of the "immortal author of the Rappor/s
du Physique et du Moral.'" Now this was no less true of Schopenhauer.
True, in Schopenhauer the ideas borrowed from Bichat
and Cabanis were mingled with other elements taken from Kant,
Plato, and Buddhist metaphysics, whereas Maine de Biran contented himself with investigating certain problems propounded by
the eighteenth century.
Yet both these men alike oppose to the
conscious personality of the Ego the dim unconscious background
which enfolds it, sways it, and even directs it, and predetermines,
unknown to ourselves, our thoughts and actions, our intelligence
and character. Only afterwards do their doctrines diverge.
Affective life constitutes in us what Maine de Biran calls "animality." Above it, but linked to it, appears "humanity," i. e.,
consciousness reflecting on itself and master of itself, personality,
or the Ego.
This latter begins to exist by itself only when exercising free activity or determined effort.
Thus and Maine de
Biran likes to remind us that he is here taking up the thought of

—

human person has of itself is originally
The Ego is first of all activity and liberty. In other words, the Ego is the soul, insomuch as it perceives
its own existence, but this it perceives only when its activity meets
Leibnitz- the idea that the

the idea of an active force.

(within the body) with a resistance which

it

endeavors to over-

come.
If this

ism

falls

observation

to

pieces.

is

correct, the whole structure of Condillac-

Sensation

is

no longer the

first fact of

con-
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sciousness,

the principle of

"sensation"

is

all

the soul's

life.

The very term

abstract and ambiguous, because Condillac did not

For, if sensation be conceived as
carry the analysis far enough.
simply passive, then it is only an "affective impression," and the
Ego does not yet appear sensation may take place without con:

Does sensation imply a motor reacThen it resolves itself into a passive and an active element.
The latter is intentional effort. In it,
and not in any received impression, must we seek the special orisciousness being aware of

it.

tion, conscious and deliberate?

gin of our active faculties, the pivotal' point of existence and the

foundation of

all

the simple ideas

we may acquire concerning

our-

and our intellectual activity.
Yet Maine de Biran does not think that the soul appears to it" I was at first rather inclined," he says,
self just as it really is.
"to mistake the inmost feeling of our individuality, or what I
called the Ego, for the very core of the substance of the soul. But
Kant has taught me better. We feel our own individuality but
the real substance of our soul we feel no more than any other subNo doubt the Ego that perceives and judges is the same
stance."
that is perceived and judged; but this being which is perceived
and judged has still an inmost core of substance inaccessible to
apperception.
It may be endowed, as Malebranche thought, with
a multitude of properties or attributes which are unknown or do not
come within the range of our inward sense. This inward sense may
indeed assure us that 7ve are thinking and on this point Descartes's
"I think, therefore I am," is irrefutable. But the most subtle
analysis of this inward sense cannot possibly throw the slightest
light upon our knowledge of ourselves, "as an object, outside of
thought." To believe that, by means of analysis based on purely
selves

;

;

we can at length arrive at the notion of a submistake the psychological fact of what is within
us, that is, ourselves in the actual exercise of thought, for the metaphysical notion of the substance which is supposed to remain the

internal experience,
stantial

Ego,

is to

same beyond and beneath thought.
Maine de Biran here agrees with Kant, as he says. In Kant,
however, the theory of the Ego's knowledge of itself has for its
basis the whole of the Critique of Pure Reason, and more especially
the theory of sensible and intellectual knowledge. Maine de Biran,
on the contrary, starts from the analysis

of the first fact of con-

sciousness, and on that analysis he afterwards attempts to found a

theory of the understanding and reason.
trine of categories,

which

is

In opposition to the doc-

quite a priori in Kant, he endeavors to
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maintain a psychological genesis of the general principles of
thought. Thus, because the Ego perceives itself as a cause, Maine
de Biran finds therein "the pattern and model of every idea of
Unity, simplicity, existence, etc., are

power, force, and cause."
ideas which the

upon

itself,

Ego

means

obtains by

and which

way

in a

of

isolates its

find these attributes again in objects,

an abstraction wrought

own

attributes.

If

we

because they have been,
In one word, reason is thus

it is

so to speak, projected by the Ego.
held to be the spontaneous result of a sort of self-analysis of con-

sciousness.

But

this is rather a sketch

de Biran was suspicious

of

than a regular theory, and Maine

everything that might carry him beyond

The science he seeks to establish
from a fact and must lead only to facts and to the laws which
they obey.
The absolute, as Maine de Biran does not hesitate to
How, he says himself, could all things
confess, is beyond its grasp.
fail to be relative in our eyes, since the very existence of the Ego,
the individual personality which is the basis of the thinking being,
The thing called Ego being a compound, or the result
is relative?
of the union and relation between two substances, can conceive or
the firm ground of experience.
starts

feel

nothing but as a compound or relation.

stance seems suspicious to Maine to Biran.
find

it

within

itself, for it

apprehends

The very idea of subThe Ego does not

itself as a

cause, not as a sub-

This idea must, therefore, originate without our knowing
It
it, in the representation of exterior things, space and matter.
was this idea that caused the philosophy of Descartes to tend in the
stance.

direction of pantheism.
liberty;

it

It is

the secret

enemy

of personality

and

tends to mingle together in an obscure metaphysical

unity the Ego-person in which everything has

the God-person

Though an

in

which

all

its

beginning, and

things end.

and deep psychologist, Maine de Biran
No doubt the study of the Ego induced
" force, while the inward
"
as
hyperorganic
think
of
it
a
him to
his
liberty
but
he
was fully aware that there
sense assured him of
ones,
which his doctrine gives
problems,
and
most
essential
to
are
the
moral
problem,
"for
instance.
answer,
Therefore he
no direct
complete
his
psychology
a
reasoned
adherence
by
wished to
to a
general system of philosophy in accordance with his inmost tendIn his second period he felt himself won over to Stoicism,
encies.
which is, in his eyes, a moral philosophy based upon the dignity
of the human personality and upon the energy of active effort.
But Stoicism expects too much from man's will; and although
original

was a timid metaphysician.

;
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makes man too weak and helpless, it was
Maine de Biran turned in the latter years of his
He then wrote his
life for the "prop" of which he felt the need.
Xouvcaux Essais (f Ant/iropologie, which distinguish in man three
lives, one above the other, as it were: sensitive life, which is in us
that of the animal; human life, that is, the life of action and the
struggle of the thinking principle against the instinctive and animal principle; and lastly, divine life, in which animalism is conquered and the struggle ceases because love has united man to the
supreme source of all beings and all good. And thus, in a sort of
quietism, ended this philosophy which had begun as a continuation
Christianity, in

its

turn,

to Christianity that

of Condillac

and Cabanis.

